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RECENT DECISIONS
Texas Sunday Closing Law -Certificates of Emer-
gency - Duty of Seller to Inquire
Petitioner filed suit seeking to enjoin respondent from violating
the Texas Sunday Closing Law1 by selling prohibited merchandise on
both Saturday and Sunday. Respondent claimed he had complied
with section 4a of the statute' which allows such sales if the pur-
chaser certifies in writing that an "emergency" exists and that the
purchase is an "emergency" purchase. The respondent provided a
written form for this purpose and required each purchaser of pro-
hibited goods to execute one; however, he made no further inquiry
into the purchaser's good faith or into the kind of "emergency" that
existed. The trial court held that the statute places a duty of inquiry
upon the seller in addition to the use of the certificate, and that unless
the seller believes, "after inquiry, on reasonable grounds, in the exer-
cise of good faith" that the purchase is an emergency purchase, the
sale is prohibited by the statute. The court of civil appeals dissolved
the injunction imposed by the trial court;' the supreme court affirm-
ed the action. The certificate used by the respondent complied with
the statute and no duty is placed upon the seller to determine whether
such certificate is executed in good faith. State v. Shoppers World,
Inc. - Tex. -, 380 S.W.2d 107 (1964).
The court in the principal case applied the universally accepted
rule of constitutional law that a statute, if susceptible of two inter-
pretations, will be given the one which is constitutionally acceptable.
It stated that if section 4a were given the interpretation adopted by
the trial court and by the state, it would be unconstitutional because
of failure to provide sufficient guides or criteria for the seller to fol-
low when making the "good faith" test of purchaser's motives.
The majority opinion expressly recognized the fact that: "It is
difficult to conceive of any set of circumstances under which a pur-
chase listed in section 1 of art. 286a could be an 'emergency purchase'
as one would normally interpret that phrase. . . ."' Therefore, the
court strictly construed the language of the section to place upon
the seller only the ministerial duty of obtaining the proper certificate.
The Texas Sunday Closing Law, even as interpreted by the court
' Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 286a (1952).
2Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 286a, 5 4a (1952).
'Shoppers World, Inc. v. State, 373 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
380 S.W.2d at 112.
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in the principal case, though constitutional, contains such vague
language that its terms are, for the most part, unenforceable. While
the statute requires the retailer to obtain a certificate from each
buyer of prohibited items, it sets forth no clear standard by which
buyers or courts are to judge whether the purchase is an "emergency"
one. The buyer is required only to state that the purchase is for his
own "welfare", "health", and "safety".' Such standards obviously
emasculate the original intent of the so-called Blue Laws. Therefore,
Penal Code article 286a, unless re-examined and clarified by the
legislature, will remain in the statute books only as a nuisance to the
retailer and as a burden to the conscience of the week-end shopper.
R.B.L.
Contracts - Acceleration Clauses in Notes - Waiver
of Rights
Plaintiffs were holders of four promissory vendor's lien notes on
hotel properties. The contract of sale contained an "acceleration
clause" allowing the note holder, at his option, to accelerate the ma-
turity of the notes if the purchaser corporation failed to perform
any of the agreements in the note or in the accompanying deed of
trust, chattel mortgage, and pledge agreement. The chattel mortgage
contained a provision barring the sale of any of the personal property
of the hotel without the consent of the plaintiff mortgagee. The de-
fendant mortgagor later sold all of the hotel properties and began
dissolution procedure. Plaintiff brought suit to enjoin the dissolution
of the defendant corporation, accelerate the maturity of the notes,
and foreclose the liens. The trial court and the court of civil appeals'
held that the plaintiffs had waived their rights under the contract of
sale by accepting the monthly interest payments on the notes after
the alleged breach of contract took place. Held, reversed: The accept-
ance of installments due on a note is not a waiver of the right of
acceleration if the right arises out of some breach other than the
failure to make an installment payment when due. A. R. Clark Inv.
Co. v. Green, - Tex. -, 375 S.W.2d 425 (1964).
The Court in the principal case adopts a rule which is well settled
' The certificate signed by the purchaser need not even be signed under oath. A.M.
Servicing Corp. v. State, 380 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
' Green v. A. R. Clark Inv. Co., 363 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
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in some other jurisdictions' but which had not been determined
clearly in Texas. The Court carefully noted and emphasized that
acceptance of installment payments is not a waiver of acceleration
rights only if the breach giving rise to the right is something other
than failure to meet an installment payment. It is well settled in Texas
and elsewhere that acceptance by the mortgagee of past due install-
ments will act as a waiver of the mortgagee's rights to accelerate the
notes which arose because of the mortgagor's failure to meet the
payment at the proper time.'
At first, the holding in the principal case seems to allow noteholders
in Texas to collect regular installment payments after a breach, yet
to maintain a right to accelerate at any time. Such is not the case,
however. The noteholder is estopped from asserting the right to
accelerate if he expressly or impliedly gives his permission to the
breach, or if he delays for more than a reasonable time in exercising
the right.4 The most that can be said for the principal case as a bene-
fit to noteholders is that it relieves them of the obligation of making
an immediate decision whether or not to accelerate.
R.B.L.
Federal Estate Tax - Charitable Deduction - Prop-
erty Passing by Escheat
This was an action for refund of estate taxes paid by the adminis-
trator of an estate. Decedent died intestate and left no living rela-
tives to whom his estate could pass under the laws of Pennsylvania.
Therefore, his entire estate escheated to the state. Decedent's adminis-
trator claimed that the estate was exempt from federal estate tax
because all the property therein had been "transferred" to the state
within the meaning of section 2055.1 Held: Property passing to the
state by escheat is not a "transfer" to the state by the decedent and
will not qualify for the charitable deduction. Senft v. United States,
319 F.2d 642 (3d Cir. 1963).
Section 2055 (a) (1) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code provides
'Federal Land Bank v. Mulhern, 180 La. 627, 157 So. 370 (1934); Freund v. Weisman,
101 N.J. Eq. 245, 137 Atl. 885 (1927); Luke v. Patterson, 192 Okla. 631, 139 P.2d 175
(1943).
'Cofer v. Beverly, 184 S.W. 608 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916); 36 Am. Jur. Mortgages 5 402.
4 375 S.W.2d at 434; 36 Am. Jur. Mortgages § 399.
' Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 2055.
[Vol. 18
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for exemption from estate taxation all "bequests, legacies, devises,
or transfers . . . to or for the use of the United States, any State,
Territory, any political subdivision thereof, or the District of
Columbia for exclusively public purposes." The principal case was
one of first impression in interpreting this provision with respect to
property passing by escheat.
Because there existed no direct authority on the point, the court
followed the Treasury Regulations' which provide that in order to
qualify for the exemption the property must pass by intervivos gift
or by will. The reasoning in the principal case is comparable to that
in other recent cases; it seems to be a mandatory prerequisite for
claiming the deduction that the decedent actually intend to make
a direct and exclusive testamentary transfer of the property to the
public, charitable, or religious institution and that he express that
intention in the will. The court does not discuss the possibility that
the decendent might have known his property would pass to the
state and intended for it to do so, but the language of the opinion
indicates that even in this case, in the absence of a will making a
direct devise, the property would not be exempt.'
R.B.L.
Service of Process - Texas Long-Arm Statute-
Concept of Doing Business
Plaintiff administratrix sued defendant manufacturer for wrong-
ful death, alleging negligence and breach of implied warranty of
fitness in the manufacture of products purchased from a distributor
by decedent's employer. Defendant was a foreign corporation licensed
to do business in Texas, but it had designated no agent for service of
process in the state. Service was perfected under the Texas out-of-
state service of process statute, article 2031b.' Defendant specially
appeared to contest the jurisdiction of the court over its person and
alleged that it was not "doing business"' in Texas within the meaning
2Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-1 (1958).
'City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 118 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
373 U.S. 949 (1963); Cox v. Commissioner, 297 F.2d 36 (2d Cit. 1961).
' See a discussion of the problem in Cox v. Commissioner, 297 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1961).
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1964).
2Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2031b, § 4 (1964) states: "For the purpose of this
Act . . . any foreign corporation . . . shall be deemed doing business in this State by
.... the committing of any tort in whole or in part in this State."
1964]
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of article 203 lb; in the alternative, defendant contended that article
2031b is unconstitutional as a violation of due process to the extent
that it provides for service of process on the defendant. Held: (1)
section 4 of article 2031b, defining the term "doing business," in-
cludes within its terms a tortious act committed outside the state
if the injury caused by that act occurs in Texas; (2) the partial
commission of a single tort within the State of itself is a sufficient
"minimum contact"' with the state to make constitutionally valid
statutory substituted service of process upon a state official in an in
personam action. Hearne v. Dow-Badische Chem. Co., 224 F. Supp.
90 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
This decision places the broadest interpretation to date upon the
Texas long-arm statute. The court stated that, even though the
tortious act was committed outside of the state, the injury occurred
in Texas; and thus the act was sufficient to constitute doing business
under section 4 of article 203 1b, because it was a partial commission
of a single tort within the state. This interpretation greatly extends
the jurisdiction of the Texas courts to allow service on manufacturers
who neither have sold to nor have had any direct contact with
residents of Texas.
Although it gives a broad interpretation to section 4 of the statute,
the principal case sustains the constitutionality of article 2031b. In
contrast, in Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp.' an-
other federal district court sitting in Texas held that article 2031b
was too comprehensive and that the application of the "letter" of
the statute would not meet the constitutional "minimum contracts"
requirement. Although the court in the principal case cites Lone Star
with approval, the two decisions are contradictory in result and in
interpretation. Unlike in Lone Star, article 2031b obviously was
applied to its full extent in the principal case, and that application
was upheld as fulfilling the requirements of due process. It seems
almost certain that the Fifth Circuit will be forced to resolve the
conflict in the application of article 203 lb and to decide upon the
constitutionality of such a broad interpretation of the terms of article
2031b. Also, it remains to be seen how the Texas state courts will
interpret the long-arm provision.
R.B.L.
'Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945).




National Labor Relations Act -Section 8(a)(1) -
Employer's Grant of Benefit to Employees to Affect
Outcome of Election
The International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders,
Forgers and Helpers, AFL-CIO, notified the respondent employer
that its employees had chosen the union as their bargaining repre-
sentative and petitioned the NLRB for a representation election. The
petition was granted and an election was ordered. Shortly before the
election was scheduled, the employer announced the grant of an
extra holiday for each employee which could be taken on his birthday
and the institution of increased overtime and vacation benefits. A
letter urging the employees to vote against the union in the forth-
coming election accompanied the announcement. Subsequently, the
union lost the election and petitioned the NLRB for redress, claiming
that the employer had violated section 8 (a) (1) of the National Labor
Relations Act.' The trial examiner found that the employer gave
the benefits with the intent to induce the employees to vote against
the union in the representation election, and held that the employer
committed an unfair labor practice. The Board affirmed and petitioned
the Fifth Circuit for enforcement of the order. The court of appeals
refused to enforce the order on the grounds that even though the
employer intended to induce the employees not to vote for the union
the benefits given were permanent and were not conditioned upon the
outcome of the election.! Held, reversed. The grant by an employer
of any benefit to its employees with the intent to influence the out-
come of a representation election is an unlawful interference with the
employees' rights under section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act.' NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964).
The decision in the principal case settles a conflict between the
courts of appeal on whether, in determining the existence vel non of
an unfair labor practice under section 8 (a) (1), it is of any sig-
nificance that a wage increase or other benefit granted by an em-
ployer in an attempt to induce the employees to reject the union is
permanent and final before the representation election. It has been
well settled since the early days of the NLRB that the grant of a
benefit to employees that is conditioned upon the employees rejection
1 (a) "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-l) to interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this
title .... " 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1958).
2NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 304 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1962).
"'Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor or-
ganizations .... " 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
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of the union as their bargaining agent is an unfair labor practice.'
Here the Court extends that rule to include the situation in which
the employees are given a permanent benefit which is not contingent
upon, but which is given in an attempt to influence, the outcome of
an upcoming representation election. This rule has been followed in
several circuits for quite some time
R.B.L.
'Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944).
'NLRB v. Gorbea, Perez & Morell S. En C., 300 F.2d 886 (1st Cir. 1962); NLRB
v. Pyne Molding Corp., 226 F.2d 818 (2d Cir. 1955); Indiana Metal Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB, 202 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1953).
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